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Abstract 
 This dissertation uses behavioral and economic theories to help understand some of 
the factors (attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, moral obligation, past 
piracy behavior, punishment severity, punishment certainty, digital media cost and 
perceived value) that may influence an individual’s intention to pirate digital material. It is 
used an expanded framework based on the theory of planed behavior, addressing not only 
factors capable of influencing intention, but also using antecedents of these factors, capable 
of influence intention in an indirect fashion.  
This work assists to fulfill the need to study digital piracy across different cultures, 
helping to understand how intention is differently affected and how policy makers should 
adjust policies between cultures. Although most of the factors employed are not new in 
piracy research there is an exception, perceived value, this factor was never analyzed in this 
context. Another innovation of this work is the development of two models: the first one 
considers the full sample and the second considers only those who had pirated before. A 
student sample has been used and the data was analyzed using structural equation 
modeling. 
 There were some different results between the models however, the factors 
perceived behavioral control and moral obligation were significant predictors of intention 
in both models, but subjective norms only presented a significant effect in the full sample 
model. Punishment certainty was also a significant predictor of perceived behavioral 
control in both models.  
Among the factors that were not significant predictors of intention was attitude. Its 
antecedents also showed some mixed results, punishment certainty and severity did not 
present a significant effect in both models, however digital media cost and perceived value 
were significant predictors of attitude but only in the full model. The pirate model 
confirmed the existence of a significant and strong relation between past behavior and 
intention towards digital piracy. 
 The results and implications are discussed and forms of intervention are suggested.  
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Resumo  
 A presente dissertação tem como objetivo fornecer um melhor entendimento sobre 
alguns dos fatores que podem afetar a intenção de um indivíduo piratear. Usando a theory 
of planned behavior como ponto de partida e complementando-a com outras teorias e 
variáveis relevantes, foram desenvolvidos dois modelos capazes de analisar a intenção de 
piratear. 
Esta investigação vem contribuir para a necessidade de estudar a pirataria digital 
entre culturas, colaborando para um melhor entendimento de como a intenção de piratear é 
afetada e como os decisores devem ajustar as políticas entre países. A maioria dos fatores 
analisados não são novos nesta linha de investigação, contudo a exceção é o fator perceived 
value. Outra inovação é o desenvolvimento de dois modelos: um que engloba toda a 
amostra (modelo geral) e outro apenas os indivíduos que já piratearam no passado (modelo 
pirata). Esta separação permite ainda analisar o impacto do factor past piracy behavior na 
intenção de piratear e comparar resultados entre modelos. Os dados necessários foram 
recolhidos junto de estudantes e examinados utilizando a análise de equações estruturais.  
Os resultados mostraram a existência de diferenças significativas entre os modelos, 
no entanto alguns fatores apresentaram um efeito significante sobre a intenção em ambos, 
nomeadamente os fatores perceived behavioral control e moral obligation. Todavia o fator 
subjective norms apenas apresentou um efeito significativo no modelo geral. O fator 
punishment certainty teve em ambos os modelos um efeito significativo sobre o fator 
perceived behavioral control.  
De entre os que não apresentaram um efeito significativo em ambos os modelos 
encontra-se o fator attitude. Porém, os seus antecedentes demonstraram alguns resultados 
distintos entre os modelos. Os fatores punishment certainty e severity não revelaram um 
efeito significativo em ambos os modelos, contudo os fatores digital media cost e perceived 
value demostraram um efeito significativo sobre a attitude, mas apenas no modelo que 
considera a amostra completa. O modelo pirata confirmou ainda a existência de um efeito 
significativo e forte do comportamento passado na intenção futura de piratear. 
 Por fim os resultados são discutidos e são propostas formas de intervenção.  
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1. Introduction  
 In the last fifteen years the world changed dramatically. With increasingly higher 
internet connections and computing technologies all of us became closer, breaking most of 
the geographic barriers. Nevertheless, in spite of all the obvious benefits there is one major 
problem that still torments the copyright industry: digital piracy.  
 Al-Rafee and Cronan (2006, p. 237) defined digital piracy as “the illegal 
copying/downloading of copyrighted software and media files”, such files may be 
Hollywood movies, TV series, music albums, eBooks and video games. Commonly, unless 
looking for a very specific software program or a very old movie/music album, it’s very 
easy to download (or watch online) this digital content. For that purpose, users usually 
depend on warez sites or peer-to-peer (P2P) networks
1
.  
 Previous limitations like internet bandwidth, storage space and quality 
(Bhattacharjee et al, 2003; Wang, 2005) are now a problem of the past, as Hasshi Sudler 
(2013, p.156) said, “digital  revolution has  allowed  consumers  to  copy  pure  information 
content  with  superb  quality, making  it  nearly  impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  
real  and  the  reproduction”. 
 This form of piracy, goes beyond the broadly studied illegal copying of software,  
which gain traction in the mid-80s when Richard Mason’s (1986) identified intellectual 
property rights as one of the four major ethics issues for the information age. However, 
almost thirty years later software piracy still is a major problem. The Business Software 
Alliance estimates that around the world 43 percent of the software installed in personal 
computers is unlicensed, representing a commercial value of USD 62.7 billion (BSA, 
2014). Their report suggests that the recent migration for cloud solutions may help lower 
this rate, however this kind of services are still young, adding up to 9.3 percent of the USD 
                                                             
1 P2P networks allow users (peers) connect directly to other users to download and share files (Becker and 
Clement, 2006; Neglia et al., 2007). Websites like Kickass Torrents only provide torrents, these are files that 
contain metadata about the files that users want to share and indicate the location of trackers that coordinate 
the distribution (Neglia et al., 2007), in doing so they don’t host any unlicensed material, making them very 
difficult to control. 
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398 billion global software market, but it seems clear that an increase in the use of cloud 
services will lower piracy, by giving developers greater control of the distribution, enabling 
lower prices and continuous updates.  
 Portugal constitutes an interesting example, being a country with approximately 
10.5 million habitants, and where 99.9 percent of the companies are considered of small 
and medium size: a decrease of 10 percentage points in the software piracy rate
2
 over 4 
years would have a positive impact in the gross domestic product (GDP) of 0.6 percent 
(nearly € 1150 millions), create 4244 new jobs and increase tax revenue in € 320 million 
(Centro de Estudos Aplicados da Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 2012).   
 In the music industry, Napster Inc. was the revolutionary agent, leading to the 
mainstream expansion of music piracy, supplying people with an easy and fast way to 
download unlicensed content (Becker and Clement, 2006). The music industry reacted and 
sued Napster, ending in its shutdown and filing for bankruptcy (Dansby, 2002). On the 
other hand it led to the development and growth of alternative P2P file sharing networks 
such as eMule and BitTorrent.  
 Today P2P networks are used to download any type of copyrighted material. For 
example in 2013 the most downloaded movie was “The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey” 
with 8.4 million estimated downloads on BitTorrent (Ernesto, 2013). De Vany and Walls 
(2007) found that a single widely-released movie stands to lose around $40 million in 
revenue due to digital piracy, thus the 8.4 million downloads most likely represent a huge 
revenue loss (although it’s possible to argue that some of these downloaders would never 
see this movie if not for piracy).  
 Digital piracy affects a huge number of industries, being estimated that “each year, 
digital piracy from motion pictures, sound recordings, business and entertainment software 
                                                             
2 At the time (2011) Portugal presented a software piracy rate of 40%. The most recent data available shows 
that this rate remains correct (BSA, 2014).  
Piracy Rate = (A×B-C)/(A×B), with the following notation: A= PCs getting software; B= Installed software 
units per PC; C= Legitimate software units; A×B= Total software units installed; A×B-C= Unlicensed 
software units (BSA, 2012, 2014). However, the notation here exposed is the one used by Centro de Estudos 
Aplicados da Universidade Católica Portuguesa (2012). 
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and video games costs the U.S. economy $58.0 billion in total output, costs American 
workers 373,375 jobs and $16.3 billion in earnings, and costs federal, state, and local 
governments $2.6 billion in tax revenue in the U.S.” (Siwek, 2007, p. i). 
 It is however noteworthy to reveal, that some argue that digital piracy doesn’t have 
a significant impact on sales and that it even has beneficial traits, like enhancing exposure 
(e.g. Smith and Telang, 2010). Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) found that file sharing 
of music has had no significant impact on sales, although there have been some significant 
concerns about their methods (e.g. Liebowitz 2007, 2010). Nevertheless the great majority 
of researchers found evidence that piracy harms sales (Danaher et al., 2014). 
 In the fight against piracy, following Danaher’s et al. (2014) work, interventions 
can be classified in two axes. The first regarding regulatory or voluntary interventions, the 
second whether the intervention targets the supply or demand. The same authors suggest 
that when considering the academic literature as a whole, antipiracy regulation affecting the 
demand and (or) the supply can be an effective instrument to increase media sales by 
reducing the utility obtained by an individual consuming digital pirated goods as opposing 
to proper licensed material. Additionally they conclude that copywriter companies can 
develop many market-based strategies in order to make their products more attractive to 
downloaders. In spite of this good news leading to a new approach on piracy, the 
effectiveness of anti-piracy technology has not been as effective as one might think. Digital 
rights management (DRM) has proven to be an ineffective tool that not only does not help 
preventing piracy but it discourages legitimate consumers and may even have a negative 
impact in company’s profits (Sudler, 2013). 
   More alarmingly, consumers still do not consider piracy as an inappropriate 
behavior and they do not believe that their friends and superiors think it is inappropriate, 
furthermore there is a strong believe that this kind of behavior is not ethically wrong and 
the fear of consequences for many does not concern them much (Christensen and Eining, 
1991; Wang, 2005; Lysonski and Durvasula, 2008; Jacobs et al, 2012).  
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As we can see, piracy of copyrighted material has a huge impact on a country’s 
economy, being a major issue for the whole society and not only content creators. A lower 
rate of piracy would most likely mean more earnings, more jobs and taxes. All this shows 
how important it is to investigate digital piracy, making this line of investigation truly 
important and with an actual impact in the real world, by helping policy makers (these may 
be governments or copyright organizations) to develop policies capable of reduce piracy.  
 As such, the aim of this dissertation is to use behavioral and economic theories to 
help understand some of the factors that may influence an individual’s intention to pirate 
digital material. Therefore, the research question is: What factors affect an individual’s 
intention when it comes to pirate digital media? 
 As far as this research goes, digital piracy intention was never analyzed in Portugal. 
A broader model (in comparison with previous research) is analyzed, addressing not only 
factors capable of influence intention to pirate, but also factors capable of influencing 
intention in an indirect fashion, being mediated by the previous ones. Although most of the 
factors employed are not new in piracy research there is an exception, perceived value. This 
factor was never analyzed in this context. Another interesting innovation is the 
development two models, where one considers only those who had pirated before, with the 
results then being compared to the general model, considering everyone. 
Culture also implies the need to study digital piracy across different cultures, as 
demonstrated by Al-Rafee and Dashti (2012). This is an important variable that should be 
taken in account, the study of digital piracy across cultures employing a set of identical 
base factors will help understand how intention is differently affected and how policy 
makers should adjust policies between cultures. 
 This research will replicate and extend on previous piracy work (e.g. Peace et al., 
2003; Cronan and Al-Rafee, 2008; Al-Rafee and Dashti, 2012), and presents the following 
structure. Section 2 reviews the related digital piracy literature and introduces the model 
development. The research methodology is in Section 3 and data analysis starts in Section 
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4. The results discussion and implications are in Section 5. Limitations and future research 
directions are in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.  
 A better understanding of consumer’s behavior will help develop new strategies and 
ideally reduce piracy. 
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2. Literature Review 
Digital piracy is not a new subject. It has been around us for quite some time now. 
As is indispensable, this section takes on previous research and shed a light on the literature 
that has been produced so far.  
It starts by looking to specific areas of piracy, like software, music, movies and 
culminates on digital piracy. While in this first part the focus is on results, employed 
variables and theories (all in a brief manner), the second part emerges from the first one, 
which helped select the research constructs that will be used. This second part is where the 
model development starts, the theoretical foundations are lay down and hypothesis are 
developed. It is indeed a more specific and in-depth analysis, that truly dictates this 
investigation path. 
2.1. Piracy Research 
2.1.1. Early Piracy Research 
 The first major concern regarding copyright infringement was software piracy. 
Researchers have been investigating this phenomenon since the late 1980s, but the first 
studies were mostly descriptive surveys (Peace et al., 2003; Limayem et al., 2004). One of 
the first empirical works examining software piracy, using a model based on a theoretical 
framework was Christensen and Eining (1991), applying the Theory of Reasoned Action
3
 
(TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). They found that attitudes toward piracy and subjective 
norms were both related with the student’s propensity to pirate. Their investigation 
indicated as well that this kind of behavior was not seen as inappropriate and that 
individual’s believed that others shared the same view.  
 Gopal and Sanders (1997) investigated the impact of deterrent and preventive 
measures on software developer’s profits, and found that preventive controls may have a 
negative impact on profits, but on the other hand deterrent strategies can potentially 
increase them. They also found that deterrence measures, ethics, sex and age are related to 
                                                             
3 The TRA exposes human behavior as function of attitude toward the behavior and social norms. Further 
explanation is provided in the second part of this section. 
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an individual’s propensity to pirate. In a posterior study the authors concluded that the size 
of a software industry is positively related to the government propensity to be an active 
force in the fight against piracy, and that it is inversely related to piracy rates (regardless of 
a country wealth) (Gopal and Sanders, 1998). Consequently the existence of domestic 
software industry may be a determinant factor against piracy.  
 Later on Gopal and Sanders (2000) established the existence of a significant effect 
between income and global piracy rates, and they proposed global price discrimination as 
the first line of defense against piracy. Shin et al. (2004), analyzed software piracy rates for 
49 countries, considering per capita GDP and national collectivism as independent 
variables. Finding evidence of a negative correlation between per capita GDP and the 
software piracy of a country; on the opposite the relationship is positive with a country’s 
collectivism. This supports Gopal and Sanders (2000) results and implies that not only 
“poor countries are more involved in software piracy, but also that high co llectivistic 
countries are involved in piracy” (Shin et al., 2004, p.105). 
 Tan (2002) focused his attention on the ethical judgment associated with software 
piracy, constructing a research framework that incorporated several behavioral theories and 
moderating variables capable of influencing ethical decision-making. His model
4
 
considered the effect of moral intensity, perceived risk and moral judgment, taking also in 
account the influence of some moderating variables
5
. Results supported the hypothesis that 
both perceived risks and moral judgment have a negative impact on intention, in other 
words, the higher the perceived risk/moral judgment of consumers, the lower will be their 
intention to pirate. 
 Peace et al. (2003) proposed a framework based on the theory of planed behavior
6
 
(TPB), complemented with the expected utility theory and deterrence theory
7
. Using central 
                                                             
4 The estimation method used was the two-step hierarchical regression analysis. 
5 Price, gender, age, educational attainment, income and past purchase experience. 
6 The TPB exposes human behavior as function of attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioral control. Further explanation is provided in the second part of this section. 
7 This theory proposes that as punishment probability and punishment level are increased, the level of illegal 
behavior should decrease (Peace et. al., 2003). 
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factors identified by these theories, Peace et al. (2003) proposed a model to evaluate the 
impact on software piracy done by individuals in their workplace. Each factor identified by 
the expected utility theory and deterrence theory (punishment severity, punishment 
certainty and software cost) was included as an antecedent to the attitude factor. 
Punishment certainty was also considered as an antecedent of perceived behavior control.  
 Their model was tested using a structural equation modeling
8
 (SEM) technique 
called partial least squares (PLS) path modeling 
9
 and accounted for 65 percent of the 
variance (𝑅2) in software piracy intention. It showed that attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavior control significantly influence people’s intention.  Attitude presented 
the strongest effect on piracy intention, and its predicted antecedents were found to have a 
strong relationship with attitude, also the hypothesis of punishment certainty as a control 
belief for perceived behavior control was strongly supported. Similar results were found by 
d’Astous et al. (2005) for online music piracy, with all the factors derived from the TPB 
having a positive and statistically significant impact on the intention to engage in piracy; 
additionally past piracy behavior also had a strong influence on intention.   
 Analyzing factors that affect software piracy intentions and its subsequent result on 
behavior, Limayem et al. (2004) constructed a model
10
 based on Triandis’ behavioral 
model (Triandis, 1979, cf. Limayem et al. , 2004), and found that social factors, along with 
perceived consequences had a positive relationship with intention to pirate software, and 
that habits and facilitating conditions affect the actual software piracy behavior. 
Surprisingly intentions did not led to engagement. A possible explanation is that intention 
is being override by habits and facilitating conditions. Their model analyzed using PLS 
only explained 17 percent of the variance in piracy, with the authors defending that further 
research is need before starting questioning previous research.  
 Similar to Limayem et al. (2004), Phau et al. (2014) proposed not only to identify 
factors capable of influencing intention, but also the actual engagement in digital movies 
                                                             
8 A detailed explanation of SEM is provided on section 3. 
9 Also referred to as PLS-SEM. 
10 Their model relied on following factors to explain the behavioral process: habit, affect, perceived 
consequences/beliefs, social factors, facilitating conditions and intention. 
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piracy
11
, using the TPB. The theory was used in an unusual way, since attitude toward 
behavior were measured by one’s attitude towards digital piracy of movies and their moral 
judgment. Subjective norms were measured by social habit and perceived behavior control 
by self-efficacy.  
 Their data was analyzed using SEM
12
 and they found that from the TPB original 
determinants only attitude towards digital piracy of movies presented an unexpected result, 
having a negative impact on intention. According to the authors this may be attitude being 
override by the positive influence coming from moral judgment. Moral judgment, as 
expected, had a negative impact on intention (supporting Tan (2002)) and engagement. 
Contrarily social habit positively influenced individuals to pirate.  
 At last, but not least important, Phau’s et al. (2014) research showed a positive (but 
weak) relation between intention and the actual act of pirating digital movies. This result 
clearly shows the need to further study the relation between intention and engagement, at 
least in digital piracy. Since previous authors (e.g. Ajzen (1991)) found intention as an 
accurate predictor of behavior itself. 
   Another theory that has been used to explain human behavior and software piracy in 
particular is the equity theory
13
. Douglas et al. (2007) using reciprocal fairness, procedural 
fairness
14
 and distributive fairness
15
 as antecedents of equity found that the first two factors 
were significant determinants, and that equity had a negative and statistically significant 
impact on software piracy, in other words, the higher the perceived fairness/justice of the 
exchange by the consumer, the lower software piracy will be. 
 While many previous studies have focused on software piracy, others have 
dedicated their attention to study different formats of digital piracy, such as music, movies, 
                                                             
11 An important limitation presented by this research is that, the actual behavior was measure through a proxy. 
12 However they fail to specify the SEM technique used, appearing to be a covariance-based SEM. 
13 Equity theory addresses human pursuit of fairness and justice in a social exchange (Douglas et al., 2007). 
14 Procedural fairness “is represented by the involvement and interaction of the producer with the consumer” 
(Douglas et al., 2007, p. 505).  
15 Distributive fairness “relates to purchase of software by different groups of consumers” (Douglas et al., 
2007, p. 505), for example price discimination strategies between consumers. 
10 
 
video games, and other digital media. An important characteristic of digital goods is that 
they “have high initial production costs, and very low - approaching zero - reproduction 
costs. They also have characteristics of a public good in that sharing with others does not 
reduce a consumer’s utility for the product” (Bhattacharjee et al., 2003, p. 108). These 
properties facilitated the widespread of pirated content worldwide. 
 Bhattachrjee et al. (2003) suggested that music piracy shows a number of 
similarities with software piracy. According to this author, despite the significant price 
difference between software and music albums, it is reasonable to admit that demand is 
quite elastic for both, since increasing the price of digital material has a strong positive 
effect on piracy. Furthermore, with increasingly higher internet connections consumer’s 
price sensitivity increases.  
 Gopal et al. (2004) sought out to have a better understanding of the behavior 
dynamics that drive individuals to pirate digital audio files, using the concept of piracy club 
size
16
 as a proxy of piracy level. They found that ethics has a very strong relationship with 
club size (ethical individual’s will be less likely to share pirated files), and that justice is 
positively related to ethics, but having a very small effect on club size. In addition, the 
amount of money saved by using pirated content was a moderately strong predictor of 
piracy.  The author concludes that the high price of a proper licensed audio CD is an 
incentive to piracy, indicating that users are extremely price-sensitive when presented with 
the possibility of illegally download an audio file. However, income did not influence the 
club size.  
 Their results are consistent with Bhattachrjee et al. (2003) that found that income 
has a negative effect on piracy but only for unknown songs, when the choice is made 
relatively to a known music, income doesn’t affect the decision. Furthermore they indicate 
that the general ethical model of software piracy is broadly applicable to digital audio 
piracy.  
                                                             
16 Individuals with similar beliefs join together to share unlicensed material, benefitting from sharing the costs 
incurred when buying the proper licensed material at market price, which is then distribution for all the club 
members.        
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2.1.2. Digital Piracy Research  
 More recently Al-Rafee and Cronan (2006), while examining factors that influence 
an individual’s attitude toward pirating digital material, found that subjective norms 
(influence of significant others), cognitive beliefs about the outcome of behavior, perceived 
importance of the issue, machiavellianism, age, happiness and excitement were all 
significant predictors of attitude. Moral judgment, distress, and sex were not significant 
variables influencing attitude. Their investigation was supported on the construct that 
attitude is the most significant factor influencing behavioral intention (e.g. Trafimow and 
Krystina, 1996; Peace et al., 2003); therefore attitude toward digital piracy was treated as a 
dependent variable. According to them, understanding these factors is important because 
attitude can be changed through persuasion and other means, making it possible to 
influence behavior (in an indirect fashion). Thus, a better understanding of these factors 
could be essential in lowering piracy. This study also supports previous research by 
showing that consumers believe that digital material is overpriced and that they will not be 
caught. 
 In 2008, the same authors (Cronan and Al-Rafee, 2008), using a student sample 
from a business college, sought to analyze factors that influence an individual’s intention to 
pirate software and media, attempting to offer a better understanding of digital piracy 
behavior. Antecedents to digital piracy behavior were investigated using an extended TPB 
model, which included moral obligation and past piracy behavior in addition to the original 
TPB determinants. It was (separately) hypothesized that individuals with higher attitude, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and past piracy occurrences will correspond 
with a greater intention to pirate; on the contrary, higher moral obligations correspond with 
a lower intention. The result of the SEM analysis indicated that their model explained 70.8 
percent of the variance in digital piracy intention, with only subjective norms not being a 
significant predictor of intention.  
 Al-Rafee and Dashti (2012) also argue that individual’s intention regarding digital 
piracy could change between cultures. Using two samples from different cultures (United 
States and Middle East) they developed a model expanding the TPB framework with moral 
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obligation. The model (analyzed using PLS) presented substantial explanatory power in 
both cultures, with only the variable subjective norms in the U.S. not being a significant 
predictor of intention. As expected the variables had a different impact on people’s 
intention: in the U.S. sample, intention was strongly affected by their ability to pirate and 
moral obligation, where in the Middle East sample one’s attitude was the foremost 
important factor, followed by the ability to pirate. 
 Their work shows that culture may have a significant impact in intention, and 
subsequently in individuals’ behavior when it comes to pirate digital media. It also 
highlights the need to study digital piracy across different cultures, since policies should be 
adjusted (fine tuning) to each country by governments and copyright organizations. 
 This research will examine digital piracy using the TPB as framework, since it 
shown itself as a reliable model to investigate behavioral intentions associated with digital 
piracy. However TPB will be extend using the expected utility theory, the deterrence 
theory, as well as other proven behavioral constructs like ethics and past behavior.  
 People still may ask why investigate digital piracy as a whole. The answer is that 
it’s reasonable to assume that any individual capable of download a music file is capable of 
download any other type of file. Although some might say that downloading software and 
video games is only half of the job, because the next step is to install them, it is also true 
that most uploaders include tutorials that teach how to install the illegal material. Thus this 
additional barrier is easily overtaken. It is also very common for an individual to find in the 
same website links/torrents to download music, movies, software and other digital material. 
Finally, storage capabilities and internet connection speed, barriers pointed in the past as 
deterrents to piracy, are no longer a problem (at least in developed countries). Even more 
the storage barrier is now totally obliterated since the streaming of unlicensed material like 
music, movies and TV shows is becoming commonly used.  
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2.1.3. Summary 
 The following table synthesizes the presented piracy research. 
Table 1: Piracy behavior research (source: author) 
Ethical 
Issue 
Researcher Factors Influencing 
Intention or Piracy 
Theoretical 
Underpinning 
Methodology Main Results 
Software 
Piracy 
Christensen 
and Eining 
(1991) 
Attitude 
Subjective norms 
 
Teory of reasoned 
action 
Chi-square 
statistics 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
Attitude toward piracy 
and subjective norms 
were directly related to 
software pircy.  
Software 
Piracy 
Tan (2002) Moral intensity  
Perceived risk  
Moral judgment 
Rest’s four-
component model 
Jones’ issue-
contingent model 
Two-step 
hierarchical 
regression 
analysis 
Perceived risks and 
moral judgment had a 
negative impact on 
intention. 
Software 
Piracy 
Peace et al. 
(2003) 
Attitude  
Subjective norms  
Perceived behavioral 
control 
Punishment severity 
Punishment certainty 
Software cost 
Teory of reasoned 
action 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
Expected utility 
theory 
Deterrence theory 
PLS-SEM 𝑅2 = 0.65; TPB 
components presented a 
positive impact on 
intention. 
All the anticipated 
hypotheses were 
supported. 
Software 
Piracy 
Limayem    et 
al. (2004) 
Habit 
Affect 
Perceived 
consequences/beliefs 
Social factors 
Facilitating 
conditions Intention 
 
Triandis’ 
behavioral model 
PLS-SEM Social factors and 
perceived 
consequences had a 
impact on intention. 
Habit and facilitating 
conditions had a 
impact on the actual 
behavior. 
Software 
Piracy 
Douglas et al. 
(2007) 
Reciprocal fairness 
Procedural fairness 
Distributive fairness 
Equity 
Equity theory Covariance 
SEM 
Equity had a negative 
and statistically 
significant impact on 
piracy. 
Music 
Piracy 
Gopal et al. 
(2004) 
Age 
Gender 
Ethical Index 
Justice 
Money Saved 
Expected utility 
theory 
Deterrence theory 
Covariance 
SEM 
Club size is positively 
influenced by gender 
and money saved, 
while negatively 
influenced by the 
remaining factors. 
Music 
Piracy 
d’Astous et 
al. (2005) 
Attitude  
Subjective norms  
Perceived behavioral 
control 
Past behavior 
Personal 
consequences 
Ethical 
predispositions 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
Test of 
mediation 
procedure 
TPB components 
presented a positive 
impact on intention. 
Personal consequences 
and ethical 
predispositions 
presented a negative 
relationship with 
attitude. 
Past behavior showed a 
positive relationship 
with attitude and 
intention. 
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Ethical 
Issue 
Researcher Factors Influencing 
Intention or Piracy 
Theoretical 
Underpinning 
Methodology Main Results 
Movies 
Piracy 
Phau et al. 
(2014) 
Affect 
Attitude  
Moral judgment  
Social habit 
Self-efficacy 
Intention 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
Neutralisation 
theory 
SEM Attitude and moral 
judgment had a 
negative impact on 
intention. Moral 
judgment also had a 
negative impact on 
engagement. 
The actual act of 
pirating was positively 
influenced by social 
habit and intention. 
Digital 
Piracy 
Al-Rafee and 
Cronan 
(2006) 
Subjective norms 
Cognitive beliefs 
Perceived importance 
Machiavellianism  
Age 
Happiness and 
excitement  
Moral judgment 
Distress 
Gender 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
 
Stepwise 
regression 
analysis 
𝑅2 = 0.436 
Only moral judgment, 
distress, and sex were 
not significant variables 
influencing attitude. 
Digital 
Piracy 
Cronan and 
Al-Rafee 
(2008) 
Attitude  
Subjective norms  
Perceived behavioral 
control 
Moral obligation  
Past piracy behavior 
Teory of reasoned 
action 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
 
SEM R2 = 0.708 
Only subjective norms 
were not a significant 
predictor of intention. 
Digital 
Piracy 
Al-Rafee and 
Dashti (2012) 
Attitude  
Subjective norms  
Perceived behavioral 
control 
Moral obligation 
Teory of reasoned 
action 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
 
PLS-SEM Only subjective norms 
in the U.S. sample were 
not a significant 
predictor of intention. 
 
2.2. Model Development: Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses  
2.2.1. Theory of Planned Behavior 
 The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991, 2002a) is a well known, 
recognized and empirically supported theory for predicting intentions and behavior 
(Armitage and Conner, 2001). The theory emerged from the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), which was designed to predict behaviors that are under 
volitional control, this is, behaviors that a person can decide at will to perform. However, it 
is clear that most of the behaviors are not under volitional control, internal factors (e.g. 
information, skills, abilities, power of will) and external factors (e.g. lack of time and 
opportunity) can compromise intention and ultimately the behavior. In response to this 
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limitation, the theory of planned behavior was developed, and it is considered as an 
expansion of the TRA. 
 The TPB postulates (as the TRA), that intention to perform a certain behavior is the 
immediate antecedent of any behavior; this means that a greater intention is associated with 
a superior effort by the individual to perform the behavior. Thus, a strong intention to 
engage in a behavior is associated with a high probability of an action to be performed.  
 According to the theory, a person’s intention is guided by three determinants: 
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. The first is 
a personal factor, and evaluates an individual’s predisposition toward performing the 
behavior. The second determinant of intention represents the perceived social pressures to 
perform (or not) the behavior in question, this pressure may be from friends, family 
members, authority figures, or any significant others. Finally, perceived behavioral control 
simply denotes people’s perceptions of how easily or difficult it is for them to perform the 
behavior, a simple way to avoid misunderstandings is to read it as “perceived control over 
performance of a behavior” (Ajzen, 2002a, p. 668). It is in this last construct that the TPB 
differs from the TRA. Perceived behavior control was added to deal with actions where 
people may lack complete volitional control over the behavior, and this addition greatly 
improved prediction of behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen and Madden, 1986). It is 
also important to note that the theory accommodates the possibility that perceived 
behavioral control directly influences behavior. 
 The theory of planned behavior also deals with the antecedents of attitudes, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioral control, antecedents which ultimately determine 
intentions and actions. “At the most basic level of explanation, the theory postulates that 
behavior is a function of salient information, or beliefs, relevant to the behavior” (Ajzen, 
1991, p. 189). Three kinds of beliefs are distinguished: behavioral beliefs, which are 
expected to influence one’s attitude towards a behavior, in a positive (favorable) or 
negative (unfavorable) way. This means that attitudes evolve from a set of salient beliefs 
people hold about an expected outcome. The person’s beliefs about what significant others 
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(for example parents, friends and colleagues) think he should or should not do, these are the 
underlying determinants of subjective norms and they are referred to as normative beliefs. 
Control beliefs, denotes a person’s beliefs about their own capabilities and opportunities, 
thus determining perceived behavioral control, usually greater perceived resources and 
opportunities should be associated with a greater perceived control over performance of a 
behavior. 
 Briefly, the theory allows us to understand and predict particular behaviors in 
specific contexts, assuming that human behavior is guided by beliefs (behavioral, 
normative and control) that in their respective aggregates behaves as antecedents of 
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. The last ones are expected to 
vary across situations and combined lead to the formation of a behavioral intention, being 
intention the immediate antecedent of any behavior. 
 A review of previous studies by Icek Ajzen (1991) ascertained that TPB 
determinants account for a considerable amount of variance in intentions. This is also true 
in this review, the models analyzed (6 in total used TPB as framework) explained a 
minimum of 47 percent of the variance in piracy intention and a maximum of 70.8 percent.  
 Very recently and surprisingly, some authors defended that it’s time to retire the 
TPB (Sniehotta et al., 2014). However Ajzen (2014) considers that they display a profound 
misunderstanding of the theory, fail to interpret negative findings, with some of their 
arguments being misguided “while others are illogical or patently wrong” (Ajzen, 2014, p. 
1). Thus he concludes that the theory of planned behavior is “alive and well and gainfully 
employed in the pursuit of a better understanding of human behaviour” (Ajzen, 2014, p. 6). 
 The TPB presents itself as good and solid frameworks to study the behavior 
associated with digital piracy and the first three research hypotheses follow directly from 
the theory. It is proposed that a more positive attitude toward digital piracy, a higher level 
of subjective norms toward committing digital piracy and a higher level of perceived 
behavioral control will all lead to greater intention to commit digital piracy. As such, the 
following research hypotheses are presented: 
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H1: A higher positive attitude towards piracy will correspond to a greater intention 
to pirate digital materials. 
H2: A higher level of subjective norms supportive of piracy will correspond to a 
greater intention to pirate digital materials. 
H3: A higher level of perceived control over performance of digital piracy will 
correspond to a greater intention to pirate digital materials. 
 As the first part of this section pointed out many other factors are capable of 
influencing a person’s intention and, as a result, there is a need to expand the framework. 
The TPB is flexible to the inclusion of additional predictors, as long as they are 
significantly capable of improving the variance in intention (Ajzen, 1991). Two such 
variables appear to be of interest: moral obligation and past piracy behavior.   
2.2.2. Moral Obligation 
 It seems that the use of an ethical construct in the decision making process is now 
generalized (at least in piracy behavior), this being moral obligation (Cronan and Al-Rafee, 
2008; Al-Rafee and Dashti, 2012), or moral judgment (Tan, 2002; Phau et al., 2014). This 
conveys the idea that subjective norms aren’t able to capture all moral influences. Finding 
moral obligation a significant predictor of intention, some previous researchers suggested 
that there is a need to consider not only social pressures but also personal feelings of moral 
obligation (Gorsuch and Ortberg, 1983; Conner and Armitage, 1998). 
 Moral obligation “refers to the feeling of guilt or the personal obligation to perform 
or not to perform a behavior” (Cronan and Al-Rafee, 2008, p. 530). Ajzen (1991) suggested 
that moral obligation could be added to the TPB, influencing intention in parallel with the 
other determinants. Therefore a measure of perceived moral obligation could add predictive 
power to the model. 
 It is then expected that individuals with a higher sense of morality exhibit less 
intention to pirate digital material, as such it can be hypothesized that: 
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 H4: The higher the moral obligation of the individuals, the lower is their intention 
to pirate digital materials. 
2.2.3. Past Piracy Behavior 
 Several studies have examined the impact of past behavior on intention and some 
proposed to incorporate past behavior as one of the predictor in the TPB (or TRA), arguing 
that the relation between prior and later behavior is not fully mediated by the variables 
contained in the model (Bentler and Speckart, 1979; Ajzen, 1991; Conner and Armitage, 
1998).  
 Ajzen (2002b) analyzed these residual effects of past on later behavior and pointed 
out that “existing evidence suggests that the residual impact of past behavior is attenuated 
when measures of intention and behavior are compatible and vanishes when intentions are 
strong and well formed, expectations are realistic, and specific plans for intention 
implementation have been developed” (Ajzen, 2002b, p. 107). So according to the author, 
past performance may help to improve model predictions particularly when people’s 
attitudes and intentions are relatively weak and uncertain, when underlying expectations are 
inaccurate, or when a plan of action is not clearly established.  
 In the context of this study others have included a component measuring past piracy 
behavior, and showed that (as expected) individuals that pirated digital material in the past 
are more likely to incur in the same intentions (D'Astous et al., 2005; Cronan and Al-Rafee, 
2008). Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between past piracy behavior and intention to 
pirate digital materials. 
The study of past piracy behavior creates an additional barrier, since we can only study 
the past behavior of those who had already pirated some sort of digital good. As such, the 
data will have to be divide in two samples and in consequence there will be two models, 
one considering the full sample and another with only the individuals who had pirated 
before. 
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2.2.4. Deterrence Theory 
 Deterrence theory has been used broadly across the literature, from criminology to 
psychology and economic literature. The theory postulates that individuals are rational 
agents looking to maximize their expected utility, reacting to negative incentives capable of 
deter their potential criminal acts: certainty of punishment and the severity of punishment. 
As an individual choose between engaging in a legal or illegal activity he will weigh the 
consequences of his actions due to the probability of getting caught and the severe 
punishment. Moreover if he believes that the cost incurred is inferior to the potential gain 
he should commit the criminal act. Thus individuals are deterred from committing criminal 
acts only when they perceive legal sanctions as certain, swift, and/or sever (Williams and 
Hawkins, 1996).    
 Criminological literature has generally found that punishment certainty produces a 
stronger deterrent effect than punishment severity (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001). In 
economic research since Becker (1968) many economists have examined the relation 
between crime and deterrence measures. Ehrlich (1973) developed an economic model 
where individuals are rational agents seeking to maximize their expected utility. He takes 
into account the costs and gains from legitimate and illegitimate actions and recognizes that 
individuals react to incentives, making them susceptible to deterrent strategies. The author 
found that the rate of specific crimes is positively related to the expected gains and 
negatively related with the costs associated with criminal activity, additionally all felonies 
rates are positively related with income inequality. More recently the same author tells us 
that empirical evidence is consistent with punishment and other incentives presenting a 
deterrent effect on criminal acts (Ehrlich, 1996).  However, we must look carefully to early 
studies. Cameron (1988) in a review of several economists’ work on deterrent effects, 
postulates that much of the literature may be impaired by bias due to measurement error.  
 Gopal and Sanders (1997) as previously stated investigated the impact of deterrent 
and preventive measures on software developer’s profits and found evidence that 
preventive controls may have a negative impact on profits but on the other hand deterrent 
strategies can potentially increase them. Peace et al. (2003) hypothesized that punishment 
20 
 
certainty and punishment severity have a negative impact on attitude towards software 
piracy and that punishment certainty may also have a negative effect on perceived behavior 
control. Their results showed a strong negative relation between the determinants 
postulated by the TPB and its antecedents, indicating the use of deterrent strategies as a 
mean to fight piracy. Hence a decrease in intention to commit software piracy is expected, 
but only as long the individuals perceived high levels of punishment. 
 According to the theory of planned behavior, attitudes toward behaviors are 
developed from the beliefs that underlie a person’s attitude, this is, beliefs about the likely 
consequences or outcome associated with the behavior. This means that rational individuals 
will select the behavior that they believe is associated with the most desirable outcome, 
forming a positive attitude. Therefore, it is likely that a person’s beliefs about the 
probability of getting caught illegally downloading digital material and the punishment 
severity associated with such an act will influence his attitude, intention and ultimately the 
behavior. Then it’s reasonable to assume (as previously observed) that a higher perceived 
punishment certainty/severity will correspond to a lower attitude towards piracy. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H6: Punishment certainty will have a negative influence on attitude toward pirate 
digital materials. 
H7: Punishment severity will have a negative influence on attitude toward pirate 
digital materials. 
 There is also the possibility of a person’s beliefs about their opportunities (control 
beliefs), being undermined by the perceived punishment certainty, thus increasing the 
perceived difficulty of performing digital piracy. Then a higher perceived probability of 
detection will most likely correspond to a lower perceived behavioral control, making the 
perpetrator incur in higher efforts/costs keep undetected. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H8: Punishment certainty will have a negative influence on perceived behavioral 
control. 
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2.2.5. Software and Media Cost 
 It appears that economic incentives play a major role in consumer’s behavior 
decision, with software and media price being a determinant factor. Although other 
economic factors like income, money saved and perceived cost-benefit are not the target of 
this investigation, they were used by previous researchers and represent an important 
insight to a consumer’s decision process. 
 Software piracy rate was found to have a significant negative correlation with per 
capita GDP (and per capita GNP) mainly in poor countries, with investigators finding an 
inflection point at USD 6000, where income level below the inflection point reveal a 
stronger negative relation (Gopal and Sanders, 2000; Shin et al., 2004). According to Gopal 
and Sanders (2000) this reveals an important problem: people with low income cannot 
afford high software prices, thus piracy is influenced by the significant price differential 
between legal and pirated content
17
. They propose address this problem through global 
price discrimination, which according to them is capable of maximize developer’s profits18  
and create incentives to government action (e.g. enforcement of copyright laws). Peace et 
al. (2003) also found evidence supporting this type of strategies, with software cost having 
a strong positive relationship with one’s attitude toward piracy.  
 It is then expected that software price will have an important role in the decision-
making process, since software packages usually are the most expensive digital goods, but 
surprisingly in music, price is also an important factor. The higher the price, the stronger is 
the positive effect on piracy, pointing to a quite elastic demand, as in software 
(Bhattacharjee el al., 2003; Gopal et al., 2004). In the motion picture industry, consumer’s 
perceived cost-benefit has a positive impact on intention to buy pirated content, indicating 
as well that reducing the prices of movie DVDs would most likely have a negative impact 
on piracy (Wang, 2005).  
                                                             
17 At the time was usual to buy physical pirated content (e.g. CDs) as opposed to downloading. These direct 
costs are the one’s referred by the authors, however today pirates usually download all their unlicensed 
content from the internet, incurring only in indirect costs, as having a PC with internet connection (we believe 
these are indirect costs because the ordinary person will not primarily use their PC to pirate digital material).   
18 If developers make their software more affordable, it’s expected that more people will buy it. 
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 In a general way, consumers seem to believe that digital media is overpriced, using 
piracy as a mean to save money (AI-Rafee and Cronan, 2006). So it appears that even when 
the price of a digital good is low, and probably does not represent an economic burden, it 
still has an impact on the decision-making process.  
 If piracy behavior is modeled through the expected utility from choosing between 
illegal download, purchase, or do without the digital good, a rational agent will choose the 
utility function
19
 that maximizes his expected utility. Therefore utility is used as a way to 
describe his preferences among the alternatives, and the correspondent characteristics of 
each alternative (Varian, 2009). Considering the expected costs and benefits, he will select 
the alternative that he believes is associated with the most desirable outcome. If piracy 
yields a positive surplus, despite being negatively affected by the risk inherent to 
punishment certainty and severity (among other factors), a lower price would decrease the 
payoff, ceteris paribus.        
 The cost of digital material can be incorporated into the TPB as an antecedent of 
attitude by the same reasons appointed in the deterrence theory. It is therefore expected that 
a higher the financial cost will correspond to a higher attitude towards piracy, due to the 
higher expected payoff. As such, can be hypothesized that: 
H9: Digital media cost will have a positive influence on attitude toward pirate 
digital materials. 
2.2.6. Perceived Value 
 It is expected that the higher the price the higher will be the attitude towards piracy, 
however the perceived price may not be enough to evaluate a digital good, and in this way 
another factor was added to capture a broader set of perceived characteristics. 
 This factor is perceived value, and helps us understand if consumers perceive digital 
goods as high value products, that are worthy of their financial cost, or on the other end, the 
                                                             
19 We may look at this function as an ordinal utility function, however the utility function only exists if a 
consumer preferences respect the following axioms: completeness, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity. The 
first tree axioms render the behavior of a rational agent. 
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time, effort and risk associated with pirate them. So what is value? When someone is 
evaluating the value of a certain good, they are forming their own construct, thus perceived 
value is an abstract concept that is highly personal and individualistic (Zeithaml, 1998;Chu 
and Lu, 2007). Zeithaml (1998, p.14) defined it as the “consumer’s overall assessment of 
the utility of a product based on perceptions of what is received and what is given”. 
Therefore, if a consumer believes that a product has a low (or high value), it is the net result 
between the assessed gains (e.g. intrinsic attributes, volume, quality) and sacrifices (e.g. 
money, time, effort). 
 Previous authors have studied perceived value in very diverse products or services, 
and found evidence of a positive relation between perceived value and consumer 
willingness-to-buy (or purchase intentions) (Dodds et al.1991, Chu and Lu, 2007). 
However, no one ever (at least as far as we know) applied this concept to digital piracy and 
so we may expect that the higher the perceived value, the lower will be one’s attitude to 
pirate. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H10: Perceived value will have a negative influence on attitude toward pirate digital 
materials. 
 It is also expected that price will have an influence on perceived value however, the 
direction (positive or negative) of that influence is uncertain. Dodds et al. (1991) told us 
that price has a double function, it may serve has an indicator of sacrifice, leading to a 
negative impact on the perceived value, and at the same time can be an indicator of quality, 
since higher prices lead to higher perceived quality and as a result to a higher perceived 
value. This tradeoff forms an individual’s perception of value, with the authors finding 
some mixed results for the relation price-quality, but support for a negative relation 
between price and a buyer’s perception of value, as the price increases the perceived value 
decreases. 
2.2.7. Conceptual Model 
 An easy and simple way to summarize all the postulated hypotheses is to observe 
the conceptual model presented in the next page. This conceptual model truly represents 
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not one, but two models: a first one will consider the full sample, but not evaluating the 
effect of past piracy behavior in intention (Full Model); and a second one, that has been 
obtained by adding past piracy behavior and, as consequence, will only considers those 
who had pirated (Pirate Model). The dashed path between past piracy behavior and 
intention is meant to indicate exactly this, since this factor will only be in one of the 
models. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model. Expanded from Peace et al. (2003) and Cronan and Al-Rafee (2007).  
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3. Research Methodology 
After a review of piracy research and the structural theories on which this work is 
built, it is now time to bring the conceptual model out of the paper. This section makes this 
required next step, to put it simply, answers to the following three questions: how was the 
questionnaire developed; how the latent variables (factors) will be measure using primary 
data; and how the collected data will be analyzed. 
This section is divided in three parts. In first one is covered the development of the 
questionnaire, being highlighted the measured factors as well the corresponding sources. 
The second part addresses data collection and the last one explains a technique called 
structural equation modeling. This technique will be used to validate the data and elaborate 
the models thus, an in depth look to SEM is indispensable. 
3.1. Questionnaire 
The data used in this research was collected using a questionnaire written in 
Portuguese, which can be found on Appendix A. It was also created an online version
20
 to 
facilitate distribution and reach as many people as possible. In order to avoid 
misinterpretations the initial page explained what digital piracy is, and how the 
questionnaire should be filled.  
 Individuals were asked to voluntarily participate, their anonymity and 
confidentiality being assured by the author. These aspects had to be assured because digital 
piracy is an illegal act and this research has a strong ethical component, as such these 
measures may help to facilitate responses but also, and more importantly, truthful ones. 
These concerns were also very important in the decision of not measuring behavior itself, 
but using instead intention as a proxy for their predicted digital piracy behavior, since it 
would be impossible to identify the respondents to a follow-up questionnaire.  
                                                             
20 The online version was identical to the paper version, but with some visual modifications to better 
accommodate it to the online platform 
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 To help ensure measurement reliability and validity, all the factors and 
measurement variables used were based on previous validated research, as we can see on 
Table 2, but some adjustments were necessary to conform the indicators to this research. 
 A preliminary version of the questionnaire was developed and pre-tested in one 
focus group discussion
21
, as well distributed to individuals that gave their feedback. This 
was a necessary and very important step to ensure that respondents understand all the 
questions. Overall, the feedback was positive, with some punctuation and words/sentences 
changed due to their ambiguous statement. The instructions to fill in the questionnaire also 
emerged from the pre-test, considering that those who were not familiar with Likert scales 
did not understand immediately what was being asked.   
3.1.1. Measured Factors and Correspondent Sources 
Following the hypotheses developed and the theoretical foundations on that they are 
constructed, it is time to specify how the unobserved variables presented on the conceptual 
model (Figure 1) will be measured. All the factors and correspondent indicators that will be 
used are listed in Table 1, with all the items being scored on a seven-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” in almost all indicators. 
Table 2: Questionnaire instrument scale factors 
Factor Source No. of indicators Indicator location 
on questionnaire 
Intention (INT) Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008); 
Peace et al. (2003) 
3 Page 3; Set 1 
Attitude (ATT) Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008) 4 Page 2; Set 1 
Subjective Norms (SN) Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008) 3 Page 3; Set 2 
Perceived Behavioral 
Control (PBC) 
Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008) 5 Page 2; Set 2 
Moral Obligation (MO) Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008) 3 Page 5; Set 1 
                                                             
21 The focus group discussion took place in early March, where four students colleagues participated. 
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Factor Source No. of indicators Indicator location 
on questionnaire 
Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008); 
Author 
2 Page 2; Set 3 
Punishment Severity (PS) Peace et al. (2003) 2 Page 3; Set 3 
Punishment Certainty (PC) Peace et al. (2003) 2 Page 4; Set 1 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) Peace et al. (2003) 3 Page 4; Set 2 
Perceived Value (PV) Dodds et al. (1991) 3 Page 4; Set 3 
Note: The questionnaire can be found on Appendix A 
3.2. Data 
Data was collected using an online questionnaire and a paper one. This decision 
may have a biasing effect on the results, however, it should be minor and negligible. 
The URL to the online questionnaire was sent by e-mail to 28 715 students of 
University of Porto, while the paper one was administered to 79 students during regular 
class time in Carrazeda de Ansiães high school. The questionnaire was online during the 
month of April and the paper version was also distributed in the middle of the same month. 
A total of 590 questionnaires were collected. From these, twenty-seven had missing data 
which led to a sample of 563 questionnaires with complete data.  
The use of a student sample was deemed appropriated in the context of this research 
for four main reasons: 
a) Previous researchers have shown that digital piracy is generalized 
among the students (Im and Van Epps, 1991; Cronan and Al-Rafee, 
2008);  
b) Students samples have been used in several piracy studies (Peace et 
al., 2003; Gopal et al., 2004; Limayem et al., 2004; D'Astous et al., 
2005; Wang, 2005; AI-Rafee and Cronan, 2006; Lysonski and 
Durvasula, 2008; Cronan and Al-Rafee, 2008; Al-Rafee and Dashti, 
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2012; Phau et al., 2014), thus using a student sample will facilitate 
comparisons between studies;  
c) Today’s students will be tomorrow’s work force; and 
d) Since it is difficult to use random sampling methodologies due to the 
scope of the work, students constitute a good target population for 
convenience sampling. 
       
3.3. Estimation Procedure 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used in this investigation. SEM is a 
technique to “specify, estimate, and evaluate models of linear relationships among a set of 
observed variables in terms of a generally smaller number of unobserved variables” (Shah 
and Goldstein, 2006, p.149). However we should not look to SEM as a technique, but 
instead as  set of related procedures design to evaluate how well a proposed conceptual 
model is consistent (fits) with the data (Kline, 2011). Furthermore, SEM allows mult iple 
exogenous and endogenous variables to be estimated simultaneously (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988), this represents a major advantage over multiple regression.  
Why use SEM? SEM has been considered a better (and best suited) technique for 
theory testing and development than estimation methods that analyze a single equation at a 
time, because (when all the prerequisites are fulfilled) the estimation methods employed by 
SEM provide a more efficient and consistent parameter estimates; it also deals with the 
overall model fit (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Kline, 2011). This technique is also 
commonly used in piracy research, for example, as we saw was used by Peace et al. (2003), 
Limayem et al. (2004), Douglas et al. (2007), Cronan and Al-Rafee (2008), and Al-Rafee 
and Dashti (2012). 
 Observed variables are usually used as an indirect measure of unobserved variables, 
and are typically referred to as an indicator (or measurement variable), while unobserved 
variables are normally called latent variables (factors or research constructs), and generally 
correspond to hypothetical constructs or factors (Gefen et al., 2000; Kline, 2011).  
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 A SEM model combines a measurement model and a structural model. The 
measurement model (a confirmatory factor analysis model) is an a priori model (developed 
from theoretical expectations) that identifies the latent variables and their correspondent 
indicators (Gefen et al., 2000; Kline, 2011). The structural model (a path model) represents 
the hypothesized effect priorities, however dissimilar from path models these effects can, 
and usually involve latent variables (Gefen et al., 2000; Kline, 2011). 
 The most common SEM model, that will be used in this work, is a structural 
regression model (SR model), also known as LISREL model. This is considered a 
covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Gefen et al., 2000), 
where “model fitting to compare the covariance structure22 fit of the researcher’s model to a 
best possible fit covariance structure” is used (Gefen et al., 2000, p. 26). The fit between 
the data and the conceptual model is assessed through a series of model fit tests, as the ratio 
of chi-square to degrees of freedom, the goodness of fit index (GFI), the adjusted goodness 
of fit index (AGFI), and the root mean residual (RMR). On the other hand (at the individual 
path level) construct validity and reliability are assessed using confirmatory factor 
analysis
23
 (CFA) (see Gefen et al., 2000; Kline, 2011; Marôco, 2014). 
 The default method of estimation in SR models is the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation, where “estimates are the ones that maximize the likelihood (the continuous 
generation) that the data (the observed covariances) were drawn from this population” 
(Kline, 2011, p.154). It is assumed that variables are continuous and normally distributed. 
However, as this assumption is frequently relaxed, the variables will be measured using a 
Likert scale. Therefore, it will be assumed (as Marôco, 2014) that as long as the number of 
categories or scale points used is high (at least five) and that the distribution is close to a 
normal distribution they can be treated as continuous variables.     
                                                             
22 Covariance structure is the part of a SEM that represents hypotheses about variances and covariances 
(Kline, 2011). 
23 The CFA should show convergent validity and discriminant validity, otherwise the measurement model 
must be respecified.   
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4. Results 
As the title above suggests, it is now time to focus on results. This section is divided 
in two parts, starting with a descriptive analysis. This type of analysis despite its simplicity 
is very important, allowing for a sample overview. First we take a look at sample 
demographics and then past piracy behavior. Past behavior was also segmented according 
to demographic characteristics.  
The second part is where the multivariate analysis begins. An exploratory factor 
analysis is carried out (to have a deeper view at the data) followed by SEM. To validate the 
measurement models a confirmatory factor analysis is implemented. Given an acceptable 
measurement model, the second step is to identify and specify the structural model. The 
final SR models (structural model + measurement model) are then presented and evaluated.  
All the results were obtained using SPSS Statistics 21 (essentially for descriptive data 
analysis) and subsequently AMOS 21 (for SEM).  
4.1. First Exploratory Results 
 A first descriptive analysis shows that more than half were female students and 
37.8% (213 students) were male, the average age was 23 years. The majority of the 
students (83.3%) were either bachelor or master students, and with 79.9% of the students 
revealing that, they do not do anything else besides studying. About 75% of the students 
reported having pirated previously, from these 40.4% disclosed that they do pirate a lot, and 
25.4% does it in a daily base or almost daily. Table 3 gathers all the presented information 
and offers a more detailed view. 
The data also shows that almost 81% of the men admitted to pirate, while this 
number was lower for the women, but still very high (71.1%). Another interesting way to 
look at piracy past behavior is to break it down by education level. Only 9.6% of the high 
school students admitted that they never had pirated, which represents the lowest value of 
all, as for the reaming (Doctoral, Master’s and Bachelor’s students) they all presented 
similar values, between 25% and 27.6%.  
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 This shows us that in this sample more male than female students had pirated in the 
past, and that piracy in more generalized between the youngest. Overall, the number of 
students reported having pirated previously is still very high, around 75%. 
Table 3. Sample demographics 
  Sample 
Number of Students  563 
Males/Females  M.: 37.8%  F.:62.2% 
Average Age  23.05  
Education Level:   
 Doctoral Student 6.4% 
 Master’s Student 40.5% 
 Bachelor’s Student 42.8% 
 High school student 9.2% 
Occupation:   
 Full Time Student 79.9% 
 Working Student 18.5% 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 To have a deeper view at the data, and look for latent factors an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was conducted on all variables. EFA is a multivariate technique that is 
primarily used when there is no a priori information regarding the factor-indicator 
correspondence, this is indeed a truly exploratory technique that does not require any kind 
of hypotheses, testing both factors and indicators in a unrestricted way (Kline, 2011; 
Marôco, 2014). However, due to the nature of this study EFA was conducted in a more 
confirmatory mode, with the number of factors being extracted based on theory, this is 
fixed a priori. 
 Typically, EFA is not considered as part of SEM, yet it is commonly used to assess 
unidimensionality. As stated by Gerbing and Anderson (1998, p. 186) “unidimensionality 
refers to the existence of a single trait or construct underlying a set of measures”. The EFA 
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results are on Table 4, where we have the correlation between indicators and factors, which 
helps us understanding and identify latent factors. 
Table 4. Exploratory factor analysis 
 Indicator Factor Loadings 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INT1 ,245 ,253 ,712   ,329     
INT2 ,336 ,269 ,724   ,254     
INT3 ,271 ,354 ,595   ,353     
ATT1  ,748         
ATT2  ,817         
ATT3  ,549         
ATT4  ,840         
PBC1 ,757     ,232     
PBC2 ,851          
PBC3 ,823          
PBC4 ,524          
PBC5 ,706          
PPB1 ,270  ,279   ,783     
PPB2 ,277 ,232 ,313   ,720     
SN1r  ,244       ,738  
SN2         -,398  
SN3 ,286 ,208       ,496  
PS1       ,760    
PS2       ,973    
PC1     ,766      
PC2     ,922      
DMC1    ,817       
DMC2    ,915       
DMC3    ,274       
PV1    ,233  ,239     
PV2    -,212    ,959   
PV3        ,464   
MO1r -,275 -,360 -,324       ,268 
MO2  -,390 -,240       ,834 
MO3  -,450       -,205 ,402 
Notes: Small factor loadings were omitted. KMO=0.855; The extraction method was Maximum Likelihood, 
and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p-value=0.000. 
Each indicator abbreviation makes reference to the corresponding factor and is accordingly numbered (see 
Table 2). Some present an r, this implies that the item was in reverse scale. All reversed indicators were 
reversed again to align them with the remaining ones. 
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To establish unidimensionality each indicator should relate to one and only one 
latent variable, this is, an indicator should load on a single factor. As we can see not all 
items loaded significantly on one factor, thus unidimensionality can not be ensured to all 
variables. 
The objective of this analysis was just to have a first view of the data, and in that 
way was successful, leading to the important conclusion that we may have a 
unidimensionality problem.  However, no corrections will be made based on these results 
since EFA has some serious disadvantages, and CFA can be used to check for 
unidimensionality, with the advantage of being considered a better technique for doing so 
(O’Leary-Kell and Vokurka, 1998). 
The next sections will address this problem, and examine reliability and validity 
with the help of a confirmatory factor analysis. As decided the analysis continues with two 
models: the first considering the full sample, but not evaluating the effect of past piracy 
behavior in intention (Full Model); and the second one considering only those who had 
pirated (Pirate Model).  As a result, there will be one measurement model and one SR 
model for each sample.  All this was done because it is impossible to measure past piracy 
behavior for those who never had pirated before and to see if the results obtained from the 
full model are consistent with the pirate model. This may also help policy makers who for 
some reason would like to target only the pirate population.  
4.2.1. Full Model 
4.2.1.1. Measurement Model 
 A SEM model combines a measurement model and a structural model, the first one 
is usually validated with a confirmatory factor analysis. This technique is used to evaluate 
the measurement model fit quality towards the observed correlational structure between the 
indicators (Marôco, 2014).   
The final CFA model is presented in Figure 2, while the initial one is presented in 
Appendix B.  Model diagram symbols should be interpreted as follows: the latent variables 
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(factors) are represented inside ellipses; the observed variables (indicators) are represented 
inside rectangles, each indicator has a measurement error term, such as e1 for indicator 
INT1; the causal effect of the factor on the indicators is represented by the lines with the 
single arrowheads, while a curved line with two arrowheads represent the correlation 
between variables.  
 To get to a final model many steps were taken, following Marôco (2014). The first 
one is to analyze factor validity.   
 Factor validity occurs when indicators correctly reflect the construct that they are 
supposed to measure and is usually tested by looking to factor loadings. These should 
present values equal or greater than 0.5. Another necessary condition (but not sufficient by 
itself) is to analyze the percentage of variance in the indicator that is explained by the latent 
variable (this is simply the square of the factor loading), being considered values equal or 
greater than 0.25 appropriated (Marôco, 2014). Unfortunately three indicators (SN2, PV1, 
DMC3) did not fulfill these conditions and were removed.  
 The existence of outliers was assessed by Mahalanobis square distance (𝐷2), and 
normality was assessed using Skew (Sk) and Kurtosis (Ku) coefficients. Not a single 
variable presented Sk and Ku values that indicate a severe violation of normal distribution 
(|Sk| >2-3 and |Ku| > 7-10, see Marôco (2014)). Unfortunately, thirteen cases reported 𝐷2 
values suggesting that these were outliers, so the CFA was done without them.  
The model was then adjusted using the modification indices (MI) (greater than 11, 
as indicated by Marôco (2014)) provided by AMOS. It is important to disclose that a model 
can be artificially enhanced to perfection via modification indices, however all 
modifications must be theoretically supported. Thus, it is very important to know when to 
stop. 
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Figure 2. Final CFA Full Model (𝑿𝟐 𝒅𝒇 = 𝟏. 𝟕𝟗𝟎;⁄ 𝑪𝑭𝑰 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟒𝟖;  𝑮𝑭𝑰 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟒𝟖; 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑬𝑨 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟖; 𝑷[𝒓𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒂 <
𝟎. 𝟎𝟓] = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟗; 𝑴𝑬𝑪𝑽𝑰 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟒𝟔 ). 
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The first conclusion analyzing the MI was that MO1r and PBC2 loaded on more 
than one factor and so were removed from the model, this helps ensure unidimensionality 
and supports in part the EFA.  A second set of suggested modifications were related to the 
covariance between the error terms of the following indicators: ATT1 (e4) and ATT3 (e6); 
ATT3 (e6) and ATT4 (e7); PBC4 (e11) and PBC (e12). Since each set of indicators 
belongs to the same factor, the correlation between the errors may be occurring because of 
the similarity of wording and content, as so, the proposed trajectories were added to the 
model.  
 The fit between the data and the final CFA model was analyzed through a series of 
model fit tests, with the overall CFA model fit being considered good 
(𝜒2 𝑑𝑓 = 1.790;⁄ 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.948;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 0.948; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 = 0.038; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 < 0.05] =
0.999; 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑉𝐼 = 0.946 )24. Established a good model fit it is time to assess the construct 
reliability and validity, in particular convergent and discriminant validity. 
 Construct reliability pertains to the consistency and reproducibility of a measure 
(Marôco, 2014). This was evaluated as described in Fornell and Larcker (1981), being 
generally considered as adequate a reliability ≥ 0.7 (Marôco, 2014). All factors presented 
an adequate reliability (see Table 5) except the variable perceived value however, the 
reliability value (0.682) was so close to the threshold that it was considered as enough.  
Table 5. Consistency statistics 
Factor Reliability AVE 
Intention (INT) 0,936 0,829 
Attitude (ATT) 0,871 0,631 
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) 0,848 0,588 
Moral Obligation (MO) 0,831 0,712 
Subjective Norms (SN) 0,763 0,616 
Perceived Value (PV) 0,682 0,535 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,892 0,805 
Punishment Severity (PS) 0,907 0,830 
Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,936 0,880 
 
                                                             
24  For a better understanding, see the reference values in appendix E. 
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 Construct validity is used to assess if the used variable truly measure/represents the 
construct that we want to evaluate (O’Leary-Kell and Vokurka, 1998; Marôco, 2014). Since 
factor validity was already examined remains to establish convergent and discriminant 
validity. The first one occurs when indicators load significantly on their corresponding 
factors, this means that the behavior of an indicator is essentially explained by its 
correspondent factor, the last one is a measure of how unique each set of indicators is, thus 
discriminant validity assess the correlations between the factors (Marôco, 2014).   
 Convergent and discriminant validity were analyzed using the average variance 
extracted (AVE) for each construct, as described in Fornell and Larcker (1981). According 
to Hair et al. (1998) an AVE ≥ 0.5 is an adequate indicator of convergent validity, and as 
we can see on Table 5 all constructs presented and suitable AVE. On the other end, we 
fulfill the required condition for discriminant validity when the squared correlation between 
two factors is equal or lower than the individual AVE for them (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Comparing the average variance extracted per factor with the correspondent squared 
correlation values on Table 6 we can see that the previous condition is accomplished. 
Table 6. Squared correlation between factors 
Factors 
   
Squared 
Correlation 
Intention (INT) and Attitude (ATT) 0,309 
Intention (INT) and Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) 0,452 
Intention (INT) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,484 
Intention (INT) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,490 
Intention (INT) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,005 
Intention (INT) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,036 
Intention (INT) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,062 
Intention (INT) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,158 
Attitude (ATT) and Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) 0,172 
Attitude (ATT) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,448 
Attitude (ATT) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,259 
Attitude (ATT) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,000 
Attitude (ATT) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,036 
Attitude (ATT) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,020 
Attitude (ATT) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,065 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,266 
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Factors 
   
Squared 
Correlation 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,398 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,023 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,026 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,040 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,184 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,423 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,012 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,014 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,058 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,141 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,022 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,041 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,115 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,270 
Perceived Value (PV) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,196 
Perceived Value (PV) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,002 
Perceived Value (PV) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,006 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,000 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,017 
Punishment Severity (PS) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,231 
 
4.2.1.2. SR Model 
 Given an acceptable measurement model, the second step is to identify and specify 
the structural model, this type of strategy (two-step) helps ensure that the measurement 
model is correctly validated (Marôco, 2014). In this section is introduced the final adjusted 
(using the modification indices) SR model (structural model + measurement model) and 
evaluated its adjustment quality using a set of fit statistics. 
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Figure 3. Final Full Sample SR Model. Path coefficient estimates are reported as standardized (∗∗p<0.01; ∗0.01≤p≤0.05; ns (not significant)p>0.05). 
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 The overall model fit is satisfactory (𝑋2 𝑑𝑓⁄ =  2.14; 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.970;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 =
0.934; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 = 0.046; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 < 0.05] = 0.890) however, it fails the model chi-
square test (𝜒2 = 447.852, 𝑑𝑓 = 209, 𝑝 = 0.000). According to Marôco (2014) the  𝜒2 
test is heavily influenced by the sample size (among other factors, e.g. correlation between 
observed variables), so a model can be rejected despite truly presenting a good adjustment 
to the data simply because of the sample size. When the sample presents a considerable 
dimension (𝑛 >  400) the  𝜒2 test very often leads to the wrong conclusion, in other words, 
it is very likely to be significant (𝑝 < 0.05).This may be happening on the presented model. 
Because of this problem and others, researchers have developed other absolute fit indices 
such as the goodness of fit index (GFI) and root mean error of approximation (RMSEA). 
GFI presented a good value at 0.934, while RMSEA was acceptable at 0.046. The relative 
fit index CFI (comparative fit index) was 0.970, thus showing evidence of a good model fit. 
 Analyzing each specific path in Figure 3, we can see that three of the paths were not 
significant (5% was considered as the critical level of significance), these were: 
"Punishment Certainty → Attitude" (𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝐶 = 0.009; p = 0.846); 
"Punishment Severity→ Attitude"(𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝑆 = 0.021; p = 0.624); and 
"Attitude→ Intention"(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0.087; p = 0.089).  
 The remaining TPB components had a significant but moderated effect on 
intention(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑆𝑁 = 0.257; p < 0.01; 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑃𝐵𝐶 = 0.358; p < 0.01), with moral obligation 
also having a significant but moderated effect on intention(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑀𝑂 = −0.307; p < 0.01). 
Attitude had a significant but moderated effect on perceived behavioral control(𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐶.𝐴𝑡𝑡 =
0.349; p < 0.01), and attitude remaining antecedents exhibited a significant but small 
effect(𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝑉 = 0.118; p = 0.016; 𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝐷𝑀𝐶 = 0.155; p < 0.01). Punishment certainty 
had a moderated effect on perceived behavioral control(𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐶.𝑃𝐶 = −0.348; p < 0.01). 
Finally, the path "Moral Obligation → Attitude" was the one that presented the higher path 
coefficient(𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑀𝑂 = −0.699; p < 0.01). 
 The final full model explains 63% of the variance in digital piracy intention. 
 
41 
 
4.2.2. Pirate Model 
 This second model considers only those students who had pirated and therefore, the 
sample was smaller adding up to 421 entries.       
4.2.2.1. Measurement Model 
 The final CFA pirate model is presented in Figure 4, while the initial one is 
presented in Appendix C. To get to this final model we yet again follow Marôco (2014).  
 The first step was to analyze factor validity, unfortunately the same three indicators 
(SN2, PV1, DMC3) failed again to fulfill the required conditions and were removed from 
the model. The Skew and Kurtosis coefficients showed adequate values that made possible 
to admit a normal distribution for almost all observed variables, the exception was PBC4 
and consequently was removed. The existence of outliers assessed by Mahalanobis square 
distance displayed five cases with values suggesting that these were outliers, so the CFA 
was conducted without them.  
The model was then adjusted using the modification indices (greater than 11), a set 
of suggested modifications were related to the covariance between the error terms of the 
following indicators: ATT1 (e4) and ATT3 (e6); ATT3 (e6) and ATT4 (e7); MO1r (e13) 
and MO3 (e15). The suggested trajectories were added to the model since that all relations 
are between items that load on the same factor. The correlation between the errors may be 
occurring because of the similarity of wording and content. 
 The fit between the data and the final CFA pirate model was overall considered as 
good (𝑋2 𝑑𝑓 = 1.761;⁄ 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.969;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 0.926; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 = 0.043; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 <
0.05] = 0.966; 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑉𝐼 = 1.580 ).  
 Established a good model fit, construct reliability, convergent and discriminant 
validity were analyzed. All factors presented an adequate reliability and demonstrated 
convergent as well discriminant validity (see Appendix D). 
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Figure 4. Final CFA Pirate Model (𝐗𝟐 𝐝𝐟 = 𝟏. 𝟕𝟔𝟏;⁄ 𝐂𝐅𝐈 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟔𝟗;  𝐆𝐅𝐈 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟐𝟔; 𝐑𝐌𝐒𝐄𝐀 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒𝟑; 𝐏[𝐫𝐦𝐬𝐞𝐚 <
𝟎. 𝟎𝟓] = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟔𝟔; 𝐌𝐄𝐂𝐕𝐈 = 𝟏. 𝟓𝟖𝟎 ). 
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4.2.2.2. SR Model 
 The final SR pirate model (Figure 5) revealed a satisfactory model fit (𝜒2 =
447.852, 𝑑𝑓 = 209, 𝑝 = 0.000; 𝑋2 𝑑𝑓⁄ =  1.960; 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.957;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 0.910; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 =
0.048; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 < 0.05] = 0.694). However, when we examine each specific path we can 
see that six paths were not significant, these were: 
i. "Perceived Value → Attitude" (𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝑉 = 0.096; p = 0.078);  
ii. "Digital Media Cost → Attitude" (𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝐷𝑀𝐶 = 0.083; p = 0.083); 
iii. "Punishment Certainty → Attitude" (𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝐶 = 0.056; p = 0.279); 
iv. "Punishment Severity→ Attitude"(𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑃𝑆 = −0.006; p = 0.897); 
v. "Attitude→ Intention"(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0.042; p = 0.465); and 
vi. "Subjective Norms → Intention" (𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑆𝑁 = 0.084; p = 0.118). 
The decision to use the standard level of significance instead of 10% culminated in 
the rejection of some hypothesis that otherwise would not be rejected, this is true for both 
models and it is important to take in account when comparing the conclusions here 
presented with other authors.   
The remaining TPB component had a significant but weak effect on 
intention(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑃𝐵𝐶 = 0.124; p = 0.003). Moral obligation had a significant but moderated 
effect on intention(𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑀𝑂 = −0.304; p < 0.01), while past piracy behavior presented a 
substantial effect on intention (𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡.𝑃𝑃𝐵 = 0.490; p < 0.01). Punishment certainty and past 
piracy behavior had a significant effect on perceived behavioral control, the first having a 
moderated effect and the second a significant 
one (𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐶.𝑃𝐶 = −0.237; p < 0.01; 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐶.𝑃𝑃𝐵 = 0.490; p < 0.01). Finally, the path 
"Moral Obligation → Attitude" was the one that presented the higher path 
coefficient(𝛽𝐴𝑡𝑡.𝑀𝑂 = −0.712; p < 0.01). 
 The final pirate model explains 70% of the variance in digital piracy intention. 
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Figure 5. Final Pirate SR Model. Path coefficient estimates are reported as standardized (∗∗p<0.01; ∗0.01≤p≤0.05; ns (not significant)p>0.05) 
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5. Discussion and Implications 
5.1. TPB Variables, Moral Obligation and Past Piracy Behavior 
 Attitude toward the behavior is a personal factor that evaluates an individual’s 
predisposition toward performing digital piracy. It was hypothesized that individuals with a 
more positive attitude towards piracy will correspond to a greater intention to pirate digital 
materials.  However, contrary to expectations attitude was not a significant predictor of 
intention in both models, as so hypothesis H1 is rejected. This may be due to the influence 
of moral obligation, which had a strong negative effect on attitude in both models and 
might diminished attitude’s positive effect on intention and correspondent significance. 
This effect was not expected, but it makes sense, suggesting that if someone views digital 
piracy as morally wrong, then his attitude would be negatively influenced. 
 This result does not support previous researchers that have found attitude a 
significant precursor to intention (see for example  Peace et al., 2003; D'Astous et al., 2005; 
Al-Rafee and Dashti, 2012), presenting a moderated/high effect on it. Usually, is considered 
that by altering attitude it should be possible to reduce piracy, thus making attitude a very 
important variable in the fight against piracy and making it more difficult since attitude was 
not a significance factor. It may also indicate that individuals pirate despite presenting an 
unfavorable attitude toward digital piracy. 
 The remaining TPB components in the full sample model presented the expected 
outcome. It was hypothesized that individuals with a higher level of subjective norms 
supportive/(perceived control over performance) of piracy will correspond to a greater 
intention to pirate digital materials. The results showed that subjective norms and perceived 
behavioral control had a significant but moderated effect on intention. As such, hypotheses 
H2 and H3 are not rejected, and we conclude that: i) the approval of digital piracy by 
friends, family (or any significant others) positively affect the individual’s intention; ii) that 
subjects that find easy to pirate and have the opportunity to do so, will most likely have a 
greater intention to pirate digital materials. The pirate model yield a similar result regarding 
perceived behavioral control, but the other variable, subjective norms, was not a significant 
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predictor of intention. Thus, it is possible that those who have pirated before may not be 
influenced by perceived social pressures. 
 Hypothesis H4 states that the higher the feeling of moral obligation, the lower is an 
individual intention to pirate digital materials. Examining the results, this hypothesis is not 
rejected for both models, with moral obligation having a significant and negative effect on 
intention. This negative relation enables to conclude that individuals with a higher sense of 
morality will tend to have a lower intention towards pirating. As we can see, it appears that 
moral obligation and perceived behavioral control play a key role in digital piracy, being 
significant predictors of intention in both models, making the connection between them and 
presenting themselves as the ideal factors to “attack”. A possible approach is to use an 
individual’s moral obligation or feelings of guilt to show that piracy is not only affecting 
company’s earnings but ultimately is a major issue for the whole society with all of us 
losing, not allowing more jobs (or even destroying current one’s) and taxes that could be 
used to directly improve people’s lives. 
  At last, it was hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between past piracy 
behavior and intention. This was indeed true, with past piracy behavior presenting a 
substantial effect on intention, hypothesis H5 was not rejected. As so, it is expected that 
individuals that pirated digital material in the past are more likely to incur in the same 
intentions. Past piracy behavior also revealed a significant and strong positive relation with 
perceived behavioral control, this relation shows that with experience we get comfortable 
doing a certain task, our sense of control gets higher.  Indeed, 40.4% of the students 
disclosed that they pirate a lot, and 25.4% does it in a daily base or almost daily, all this 
shows that past behavior has a strong and determinant influence on control and intention.  
 Nowadays we can access the internet virtually anywhere and download whatever 
we want or even give orders to our computer at home to start a download, making pirating 
so easy that can become recurrent and ultimately a habit. This makes past piracy behavior a 
very difficult factor to address. A suggestion is to restrict the number of places where 
people can access websites that facilitate the download or streaming of pirate content. For 
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example, universities and high schools would be the ideal place to start, since students 
spend a lot of time at these locations where they have access to high-speed internet. 
Another more generalized approach would be to contact internet service providers and ask 
them to block access to these websites however, the fear of losing customers may prevent 
them from doing so and usually when it happens is due to a judicial order.     
5.2. Punishment Certainty and Severity 
 As we know attitudes toward behaviors and perceived behavioral control are 
developed from behavioral beliefs (beliefs about the likely consequences or outcome) and 
control beliefs (beliefs about capabilities and opportunities), respectively. Therefore, it was 
postulated that a person’s beliefs about the probability of getting caught illegally 
downloading digital material and the punishment severity associated with such an act will 
have a negative influence on attitude, with punishment certainty also having a deterrent 
effect on perceived behavioral control (hypotheses H6, H7 and H8).  
 Contrarily to expectation punishment certainty and severity were not a significant 
predictor of attitude in both models, and presented an insignificant beta value. As so 
hypothesis H6 and H7 were rejected. However, it was found some evidence that 
punishment certainty can be a useful tool in the fight against piracy. Punishment certainty 
in both samples had a moderated and significant negative effect on perceived behavioral 
control, as a result hypothesis H8 was not rejected and led to conclude that if people believe 
that there is a high probability of getting caught they should have a lower perception of 
control and ultimately a lower intention towards pirating.  
 To explore punishment certainty copyright organizations (and/or governments) 
should lead people to believe that they are very likely to be caught, this high punishment 
certainty will affect the sense of control and opportunity, and should make possible to 
reduce people’s intention towards piracy. It is imperative to note that perception is very 
important, if people are actually caught very frequently but the general public does not 
know they could believe that probability is indeed lower and not modify their behavior. 
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5.3. Digital Media Cost and Perceived Value 
 As we saw, multiple studies have analyzed economic factors, being digital media 
cost one of them, and concluded that financial cost (even when is small) play an important 
role in consumer’s behavior. Accordingly it was expected a positive relationship between 
digital media cost and attitude (hypothesis H9). The results showed a positive relation in 
both models however, only in the full model was exhibited a significant relationship but 
with a small effect. Despite being a small effect, it was still almost twice as strong that the 
one found in the pirate model. With this mixed results we conclude that generally people do 
consider the price as an important factor, the higher the price the more likely is that the 
individual will pirate digital goods. The pirate model led to believe that some people may 
be so used to pirate that might be ignoring the financial cost, because piracy has become so 
recurrent that they simply do not know or do not care about the price. 
 The findings partially support suggestions to use price discrimination strategies 
(Gopal and Sanders, 2000; Peace et al., 2003) and this type of strategies are already being 
use by some companies, for example Microsoft on their online Portuguese store (Microsoft, 
n.d.) already has in place a price discrimination strategy for students. By lowering the 
financial cost, we can decrease the expected utility from using the pirated material, making 
the licensed content more desirable. Another strategy could be to show people that digital 
goods are not as expensive as they might think and that already exist cheap alternatives: a) 
Spotify has on their servers over 30 million songs that we can listen for free, but with some 
disadvantages (e.g. ads) or we can pay for a premium service and enjoy total liberty 
(Spotify, n.d.); b) to see TV shows  and movies through the internet it will be soon 
available in Portugal (October 2015) a streaming service provided by Netflix that is 
considered a cheap alternative to piracy (Ramos, 2015). 
  Perceived value, the new addition to piracy research, became an interesting case 
since it was hypothesized to negatively influence attitude but it ended up having a positive 
effect. Furthermore, perceived value only presented a significant relationship using the full 
sample and had a small effect on attitude. It was expected that the higher the perceived 
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value, the lower will be one’s attitude to pirate, but it appears that a higher perceived value 
demonstrates that digital goods are worthy of pirating and the higher will be the time, effort 
and risk that an individual is willing to invest due to the bigger assessed gains. 
 Digital media cost and perceived value did led to important conclusions. However, 
they were placed as attitude antecedents, but surprisingly attitude was not a significant 
predictor of intention and even though we are able to use these factors to modify people’s 
attitude ultimately our effort may not have the desired effect on intention. As so, it is 
important in future research to try to find out why is attitude not being a significant 
predictor of intention. 
 To close this section a summary table is presented below, where we have all the 
formulated hypotheses and the correspondent outcome for both models, as well all the beta 
values.   
Table 7. Model results summary 
∗∗p<0.01; ∗0.01≤p≤0.05 
 
 
 
  
 Full Model Pirate Model 
𝑹𝟐 0.63 0.70 
Factors Beta Hypothesis Beta Hypothesis 
Attitude 0.087 H1-Rejected 0.042 H1-Rejected 
Subjective Norms 0.257** H2- Not Rejected 0.084 H2- Rejected 
Perceived Behavioral Control 0.358** H3- Not Rejected 0.124** H3- Not Rejected 
Moral Obligation -0.307** H4- Not Rejected -0.304** H4- Not Rejected 
Past Piracy Behavior - - 0.490** H5- Not Rejected 
Punishment Certainty (ATT) 0.009 H6- Rejected 0.056 H6- Rejected 
Punishment Severity 0.021 H7- Rejected -0.006 H7- Rejected 
Punishment Certainty (PBC) -0.348** H8- Not Rejected -0.237** H8-Not Rejected 
Digital Media Cost 0.155** H9- Not Rejected 0.083 H9- Rejected 
Perceived Value 0.118* H10- Rejected 0.096 H10- Rejected 
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6. Limitations and Future Research  
 This research is no exception and as in all studies, there are limitations. First of all, 
it was used a student sample and as a result we should be careful when generalizing the 
results beyond the student population, even more so when the sample cannot even be 
considered as representative of the target population. Another concern is that as we all 
know intentions can change over time and these results can become outdated sooner than 
we might think.  
 A third limitation is the number of indicators used per factor, which in many 
situations were only two and not the recommended minimum of three.  At last perceived 
value, reliability value was lower than the threshold, but was so close to it that was 
considered as enough. 
 As for future research directions, multiple paths can be followed. A first suggestion 
would be to use a different sample, one that could be considered representative of the 
Portuguese population. This would increase the generalization of the findings and could be 
used to validate the achieved results. Research could also be undertaken to examine the 
actual behavior, although more difficult it would be interesting to confirm if intentions do 
lead to action.  
 Because attitude is considered a key factor and was not a significant predictor of 
intention (in both models) and usually is (Christensen and Eining, 1991; Peace et al., 2003; 
D'Astous et al., 2005; Cronan and Al-Rafee, 2008; Al-Rafee and Dashti, 2012) it should be 
investigate why this is happening. Is it because of the relation between moral obligation and 
attitude?  
 As final suggestion, a more comprehensive model could be designed to include 
other relevant theories and its associated variables, for example, the equity theory as 
employed by Douglas et al. (2007). 
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7. Conclusion 
This dissertation objective was to investigate digital piracy intention. To do so the 
theory of planned behavior emerged as the ideal framework, being expanded using the 
utility theory, the deterrence theory and other relevant constructs (moral obligation and past 
piracy behavior) that were expected to be capable of influencing intention.  The expansion, 
more particularly the variable past piracy behavior led to an innovating analysis, with two 
models being developed from the same sample.  One considered all the individuals, while 
the other investigated only those who had pirated before. The models addressed not only 
factors capable of influencing intention directly, but also employed antecedents of those 
factors, capable of influence intention in an indirect fashion. 
The sample focused on students and the data was analyzed using structural equation 
modeling. The results showed that while both models accounted for a good percentage 
(63% and 70%) of the variance in digital piracy, there were differences in the effect that 
each individual factor had in the model.  
Perceived behavioral control and moral obligation presented a significant moderated 
effect on intention in both models, the first one having a positive effect and the second a 
negative. Punishment certainty also had a significant negative effect in both models, but 
influencing instead the variable perceived behavioral control. As for subjective norms and 
attitude, the first one was only a significant predictor of intention in the full model, while 
the last one surprisingly did not have a significant effect in both models. In the pirate 
model, past piracy behavior had as expected a significant and strong positive effect on 
intention, but also in perceived behavioral control.  
At last, among the remaining antecedents to the TPB constructs, punishment 
certainty and severity were not significant predictors of attitude in both models. The same 
was also true for digital media cost and perceived value in the pirate model, in the full 
model this two antecedents to attitude presented a significant value but with a small effect. 
Digital media cost revealed as hypothesized a positive effect, while perceived value, a new 
factor in piracy research,  presented an unexpected effect since it was hypothesized to 
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negatively influence attitude but it ended up having a positive effect. It appears that a 
higher perceived value demonstrates that consumers believe that by turning to digital piracy 
they are receiving more (e.g. quality, intrinsic attributes, money saved) than what they are 
sacrificing (e.g. time and effort to pirate, possible legal actions), this is they resort to digital 
piracy to maximizing their utility. 
In conclusion, this investigation was able to corroborate some of the antecedents 
used in previous piracy research to explain piracy intention. Among the factors that did not 
present a significant effect was attitude, this relation should be further studied since usually 
attitude is a significant predictor of intention. Despite some differences between models, 
there are common factors that make possible to address together the general population and 
specifically those who had pirated before, however, more options may be available for the 
general population. It is also important to note that by expanding on previous investigation 
this research contributed to the continuous study of digital piracy across countries and their 
culture.  
Several implications were drawn and suggestions were made. This research 
contributes to a better understanding of digital piracy behavior, and hopefully will help put 
in place new strategies (or adapt current ones) and ultimately reduce digital piracy. 
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9. Appendix 
Appendix A.: Questionnaire 
Questionário Sobre Pirataria Digital 
Este questionário tem como propósito auxiliar o desenvolvimento de uma dissertação de mestrado, 
que procura investigar a pirataria digital no nosso país, tendo sido desenvolvido no âmbito do 
Mestrado em Economia e Administração de Empresas da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade 
do Porto. Mesmo que nunca tenha pirateado qualquer tipo de material digital poderá preencher o 
questionário sem qualquer dificuldade. Agradeço a sua participação, pois é indispensável para o 
desenvolvimento do meu trabalho e solicito que responda a todas as questões com a máxima 
sinceridade.  
A participação neste estudo é voluntária, e será assegurada a confidencialidade de todas as 
respostas.  
 
 
 
 
 
Idade:____ Sexo (M/F):____  
Estudante de:  
  Ensino Secundário Ensino Profissional Licenciatura 
  Mestrado Doutoramento Pós-Graduação 
Ocupação:   
  Estudante a tempo inteiro Trabalhador-Estudante Outra:____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O que é a Pirataria Digital?   
Entende-se por Pirataria Digital o download/cópia de forma ilegal de software e ficheiros de 
media protegidos por direitos de autor. Tais ficheiros podem ser filmes, musica, vídeo jogos, 
entre outros. 
 
Como preencher o questionário?   
 O seguinte questionário tem como objetivo avaliar o grau de concordância ou 
discordância com cada uma das questões/afirmações apresentadas.  
 Todas as repostas serão medidas numa escala de 7 pontos. Ao selecionar a 
quadrícula próxima dos extremos, significa que concorda com o adjetivo (ou 
afirmação) próximo da sua escolha, à medida que se afasta dos extremos a sua 
concordância vai diminuindo, representando a quadrícula central, indiferença 
(ou neutralidade).  
 Responda a cada questão selecionando a opção pretendida com uma cruz.  
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Considero que de um modo geral que a pirataria digital é: 
Favorável ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Desfavorável 
Benéfica ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Prejudicial 
Sensata ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Insensata 
Boa ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Má 
 
O seguinte conjunto de perguntas procura aferir a sua capacidade para piratear 
Para mim piratear material digital seria/é: 
Muito Fácil ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Muito Difícil 
Querendo facilmente poderia piratear material digital 
Concordo 
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Considero-me capaz de piratear material digital 
Concordo 
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Tenho os recursos necessários (ex. computador, ligação à internet, etc.) para piratear 
material digital 
Concordo 
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Se quiser sou capaz de encontrar material digital para piratear 
Concordo 
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
 
O seguinte conjunto de perguntas encontra-se relacionado com a sua atitude de 
pirataria no passado e a sua intenção de piratear no futuro 
Pirateei material digital no passado (Se responder não, salte as duas próximas questões) 
Sim ☐  ☐ Não 
Quanto material digital pirateou?  
Muito ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Pouco 
Qual a frequência com que pirateou material digital  
Diariamente ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Esporadicamente 
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Tenciono piratear material digital num futuro próximo 
Certamente  
que Sim 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Certamente 
que Não 
Se tivesse a oportunidade, piratearia material digital 
Certamente  
que Sim 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Certamente 
que Não 
Farei todos os esforços para piratear material digital num futuro próximo 
Certamente  
que Sim 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Certamente 
que Não 
 
As questões abaixo procuram fornecer um melhor entendimento da opinião daqueles 
que considera como importantes na sua vida (exemplo: familiares e amigos) 
As pessoas que considero importantes na minha vida pensam que não devo piratear 
material digital 
Concordo       
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Relativamente à pirataria digital, penso que devo fazer o que as pessoas que me são 
importantes consideram como correto 
Concordo                          
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Se piratear material digital, a maioria das pessoas que me são importantes iriam:  
Não se Importar ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Desaprovar 
 
O seguinte conjunto de perguntas está relacionado com a severidade da punição, no 
caso de ser apanhado a piratear  
Se fosse apanhado a piratear penso que a punição seria: 
Muito Elevada ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Muito Baixa 
Se fosse apanhado a piratear, seria severamente punido 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
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As questões abaixo encontram-se relacionadas com a probabilidade de ser apanhado a 
piratear  
Quando pirateio/(caso pirateasse) material digital, penso que a probabilidade de ser 
apanhado seria: 
Muito Elevada ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Muito Baixa 
Quando pirateio/(caso pirateasse) material digital provavelmente seria apanhado 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
 
O seguinte conjunto de perguntas está relacionado com o custo financeiro associado 
aos bens digitais 
Considero de forma geral que o preço dos materiais digitais é hoje em dia: 
Muito Alto ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Muito Baixo 
Se quiser comprar um bem digital, este custar-me-ia muito dinheiro 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Utilizo/(Utilizaria) a pirataria digital como um meio para poupar dinheiro  
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
 
Questões relacionadas com o valor atribuído aos bens digitais 
Os bens digitais representam para mim, um elevado valor 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Considero que os bens digitais são bens com um valor justo/correto 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Considero que a compra de bens digitais é uma boa compra, isto é com benefícios 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
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O seguinte conjunto de perguntas está relacionado com os sentimentos associados à 
pirataria digital 
Não me sentiria culpado se pirateasse material digital 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
A pirataria digital vai contra os meus princípios 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
Considero moralmente incorreto piratear material digital 
Concordo  
Plenamente 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Discordo 
Completamente 
 
Mais uma vez, obrigado pela sua colaboração. 
FIM 
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Appendix B.: Initial CFA full model (𝑋2 𝑑𝑓 = 2.998;⁄ 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.933;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 0.894; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 =
0.060; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 < 0.05] = 0.000; 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑉𝐼 = 2.020 ). 
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Appendix C.: Initial CFA pirate model (𝑋2 𝑑𝑓 = 2.196;⁄ 𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.934;  𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 0.892; 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 =
0.053; 𝑃[𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎 < 0.05] = 0.135; 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑉𝐼 = 2.422 ). 
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Appendix D.: Pirate Model - Consistency statistics and squared correlation between factors 
Factor Reliability AVE 
Intention (INT) 0,913 0,777 
Attitude (ATT) 0,851 0,592 
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) 0,891 0,674 
Moral Obligation (MO) 0,773 0,534 
Subjective Norms (SN) 0,697 0,535 
Perceived Value (PV) 0,701 0,560 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,909 0,834 
Punishment Severity (PS) 0,883 0,791 
Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,898 0,815 
Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,883 0,791 
 
Factors 
 
Squared 
Correlation 
Intention (INT) and Attitude (ATT) 0,286 
Intention (INT) and Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) 0,303 
Intention (INT) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,493 
Intention (INT) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,309 
Intention (INT) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,003 
Intention (INT) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,029 
Intention (INT) and Punishment Severity(PS) 0,037 
Intention (INT) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,118 
Intention (INT) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,593 
Attitude (ATT) and Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) 0,082 
Attitude (ATT) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,487 
Attitude (ATT) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,199 
Attitude (ATT) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,000 
Attitude (ATT) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,018 
Attitude (ATT) and Punishment Severity(PS) 0,017 
Attitude (ATT) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,050 
Attitude (ATT) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,196 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Moral Obligation (MO) 0,171 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,254 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,032 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,020 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,024 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,114 
Perceived Behavioral Control(PBC) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,270 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Subjective Norms (SN) 0,340 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,009 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,015 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,053 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,147 
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Factors 
 
Squared 
Correlation 
Moral Obligation (MO) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,299 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,026 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Digital Media Cost (DMC) 0,020 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,082 
Subjective Norms(SN) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,286 
Subjective Norms (SN) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,208 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,188 
Punishment Severity (PS) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,001 
Punishment Certainty (PC) and Perceived Value (PV) 0,010 
Perceived Value (PV) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,001 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Punishment Severity (PS) 0,002 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,033 
Digital Media Cost (DMC) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,024 
Punishment Severity (PS) and Punishment Certainty (PC) 0,190 
Punishment Severity (PS) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,008 
Punishment Certainty (PS) and Past Piracy Behavior (PPB) 0,062 
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Appendix E.: Model fit tests and correspondents reference values.  
Model Fit Test Reference Values 
𝑿𝟐 and p-value The lower the better; 𝑝 > 0.05 
𝑿𝟐 𝒅𝒇⁄  < 5 − Bad fit 
]2; 5] − Acceptable fit 
]1; 2] − Good fit 
~ 1 − Very good fit 
CFI 
GFI 
<  0.8 − Bad fit 
]0.8; 0.9] − Acceptable fit 
]0.9; 0.95] − Good fit 
≥ 0.95 − Very good fit 
RMSEA 
and 
 
p-value (𝑯𝟎: 𝒓𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒂 ≤
𝟎. 𝟎𝟓) 
>  0.10 − Unacceptable fit 
]0.05; 0.10] − Acceptable fit 
≤ 0.05 − Very good fit 
𝑝 ≥ 0.05 
MECVI To compare models. The lower the better 
Source: Marôco (2014, p.55). 
 
 
 
